122 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



Here we must be on our guard against an ambiguous 

 employment of the terms " intentional " and " conven- 

 tional." Nothing can be really "intentional" that is 

 not done consciously, and "consciousness," as opposed 

 to " consentience," is admitted to be now the exclusive 

 prerogative of man. But no action which is not "in- 

 tentional" can really be a sign.* Nevertheless, a 

 distinction is to be drawn between two kinds of acts, 

 neither of which is really ^ i.e. "formally," intentional, 

 as, e.g.^ would be the contact between our hand and a 

 cat's back which we had intentionally began to stroke. 



Thus, one animal, on rounding some corner, may 

 come in contact with another, of which it had had no 

 sense-perception ; or it may come in contact with 

 another which it has seen, and which it has pursued 

 and caught. The latter contact may be loosely spoken 

 of as "intentional," though it is not, of course, "for- 

 mally " so. It may be well to distinguish an act which 

 is thus but " materially intentional " by the term " im- 

 pulsionaV — to mark it off, both from what is fully 

 conscious and volitional t or " formally " intentional, and 

 from what is merely accidental. 



As to the second ambiguous term, "conventional," 

 Mr. Romanes applies it, in part, to denote a movement 

 which animals have learnt to make by sensuous associa- 

 tion,t or have acquired simply by imitation ; and we 



* See above, p. 65. 



t Of course what is really " intentional " is also " impulsional." 

 It is that and more. 



X That is, by the association of sounds heard or movements 

 seen, with the making of sounds or gestures by themselves. It is 

 thus that the ordinary tricks of animals are acquired. 



