124 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



however, that they do occur — even every day — that 

 tendency to imitation which we know many animals 

 and human idiots possess, would amply account for 

 them without the intervention of "inference." They 

 may, therefore, be distinguished as " imitational " actions. 

 Animals, by the association of sensations, often, as every- 

 body knows, perform actions which serve as means to a 

 practical end, without either " ends " or " means " being 

 apprehended as such. "Imitational" actions of the 

 kind may well take their place in this category. If 

 animals had a true power of inference, they would not 

 perform the very unreasonable actions * they often do — 

 e.g.^ building a nest in a house in full course of being 

 taken down, or in a water-pipe, etc. 



In a note f Mr. Romanes observes : " In the higher 

 region of recepts both the man and the brute attain in 

 no small degree to a perception of analogies or relations : 

 this is inference or ratiocination in its most direct form, 

 and differs from the process as it takes place in the 

 sphere of conceptual thought, only in that it is not 

 itself the object of knowledge. But, considered as a 

 process of inference or ratiocination, I do not see that 

 it should make any difference in our terminology 

 whether or not it happens itself to be an object of 

 knowledge." 



We have already given — we trust sufficient — reasons 

 for denying to brutes any real power of intellectual per- 

 ception, while if man has, as we affirm, an intellectual 

 nature distinct in kind, such a difference of nature may 

 well hinder even his recepts from being absolutely the 

 * See " On Truth," p. 355. t p. 87. 



