REASON AND LANGUAGE. 125 



same as those of any brute.* We have also pointed out 



the essential nature of ratiocination and its distinctness 



from mere sensuous inference, as also that to suppose 



a reflex act necessary in order that a mental act should 



be conceptual and truly intellectual, is a mistake. 



Nothing more is needed for mental conception than 



direct consciousness, such, e.g., as that we have of our 



own existence when least adverting to the fact of our 



existence. We are therefore far indeed from affirming 



that the nature of a psychical process is altered by 



becoming known. That it is so altered is one of those 



things which Mr. Romanes has to prove.f Nevertheless, 



the presence or absence of a power to know a psychical 



process performed, serves as an indication of a difference 



in nature and kind between the being that has, and one 



that has not, such a power. 



Mr. Romanes next presents us X with a scheme to 



show, in diagrammatic form, the classification which he 



has himself " arrived at, and which," he tells us, " follows 



closely the one given by " ourselves. " Indeed," he adds, 



" there is no difference at all between the two, save 



that I have endeavoured to express the distinction 



between signs as intentional, unintentional, natural, 



conventional, emotional, and intellectual." This shows 



how Mr. Romanes has failed to appreciate our position. 



There is a great and fundamental distinction " between 



the two ; " and this I will endeavour also to express 



in diagrammatic form. 



* See above, p. 94. 



t Since he says that a recept is changed into a concept by 

 becoming known. 

 X pp. 88, 89. 



