128 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



Conventional, and therefore acquired, intellectual 

 language, may express either sentiments * or thoughts, 

 and such thoughts may be signified with or without 

 explicit statement — as we may or may not add the 

 words, "and therefore equal," to a statement that two 

 angles are angles at the base of an isosceles triangle. 



As to animals, Mr. Romanes affirms f that we may 

 take "as beyond the reach of question the important 

 fact that they do present, in an unmistakable manner, a 

 germ of the sign-making faculty." He tells us also that 

 " the fact is so important in relation to " his subject, 

 that he will " pause to consider the modes and degrees 

 in which the faculty is exhibited by animals." 



Here the expression "germ of the sign-making 

 faculty " is ambiguous. That animals possess not only 

 " a germ " of emotional language, but have it fully 

 matured and developed, is certain ; but that they have 

 the minutest germ of an intellectual sign-making faculty 

 is a thing we most strenuously deny. A sign, as before 

 said,t is a token depicting ideas it is thereby intended 

 to communicate ; and we have already pointed out § in 

 what sense alone actions can truly be called " signs." 

 Let us now consider the actions of animals which Mr. 

 Romanes brings forward, and see how far they indicate 

 any use of " signs." 



A wasp, finding a store of honey, "returns to the 

 nest and brings off in a short time a hundred other 

 wasps." What is there wonderful in this ? It is surely 



* As to the distinction between animal emotions and our 

 higher sentiments, see "On Truth," pp. i86, 221. 



t p. 88. X See above, p. 7. § See above, p. 65. 



