132 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



This was certainly not a rational proceeciing, while it 

 quite resembles instinctive action. 



Sir John Lubbock's experiments with glasses and 

 tapes * are interesting, but only go to prove the presence 

 of those faculties of sense-perception which no one 

 denies to insects or other animals. 



That birds utter different tones, f according as their 

 feelings are stimulated by different circumstances, is 

 what no one thinks of denying. The same is true of 

 apes, dogs, and cats ; and if barking or mewing in a 

 peculiar way, with the pulling of a maid's apron towards 

 a door which denies an exit, could prove the presence 

 of intellect in such animals, then no one could be so 

 insane as to deny it. These matters, however, are quite 

 beside the question. Such actions, instead of being 

 considered as true signs, may be accounted for as mere 

 means unconsciously employed for a practical end. { 



Whether an animal can "point," might seem to be 

 so simple a question that no mistake could be made 

 about it. Nevertheless, so great is the confusion in- 

 troduced into this simple matter, that it becomes neces- 

 sary to distinguish different significations of that term. 



When we say a dog " points," we do not mean that 

 it points as a man would. It halts in a peculiar way, 

 and onlookers know the reason why. But it does not 

 necessarily follow that the dog has any feeling of 

 relation between its actions and those of the sportsman 



* Loc. cit. t p. 96. 



X See above, p. 124. When we say " unconsciously employed," 

 we, of course, do not intend to imply the absence of "consen- 

 tience." 



