148 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



or phenomenon, than is required to depict an abstract 

 idea in gesture ; " and adds, with much truth : " This only 

 shows that where higher faculties are present, they are 

 able to display themselves in gesture as well as in 

 speech." With this we entirely agree. Where intellect 

 exists it can manifest itself either by speech or gesture 

 and where it does not exist, mere consentience may 

 associate (as in apes, dogs, and learned pigs) definite 

 articulate sounds, as well as definite gestures, with par- 

 ticular motions. 



Mr. Romanes affirms that " the higher animals 

 unquestionably do understand the meaning of words." 

 This is ambiguous. If we employ the word "under- 

 stand " in a loose and popular sense, every one would 

 admit the truth of what he says, but not if we use it in 

 its human sense. Therein, as we have shown,* the 

 ideas of "existence" and "truth" are latent, and if 

 animals understood words in that human sense of the 

 term "understand," they would certainly be able to 

 converse, at least in gesture. Such anecdotes as those 

 of terrier dogs holding food on their muzzle till the 

 words " Paid for " are uttered, or collie dogs being 

 roused by hearing " Cow in the potatoes," are easy 

 enough to understand on the very principle which we 

 have just quoted Mr. Romanes as admitting.! As we 

 are told,t "numberless other anecdotes of the same 

 kind might be quoted," but their value is far from being 

 in proportion to their number. The mere titles of such 

 books as Watson's " Reasoning Power in Animals," and 



* See " On Truth," p. 103, and above, p. 45. 

 t p. 123. X p. 125. 



