154 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



He begins by telling us,* " It is unquestionable that 

 many parrots know perfectly well that certain names 

 belong to certain persons, and that the way to call these 

 persons is to call their appropriate names." Here, again, 

 we meet with that ambiguous use of the verb "to know " 

 which we have before objected to here and elsewhere.f 

 He then decorates with the term " very proper " a fla- 

 grant statement he quotes from Houzeau, affirming that 

 the way in which " some parrots habitually use certain 

 words shows an aptitude correctly to perceive [!] and to 

 name [!] qualities as well as objects." 



These statements are either due to a confusion of 

 thought, or to a want of care to avoid playing fast and 

 loose with terms, and so — practically, however uncon- 

 sciously — throwing dust into the eyes of readers not 

 careful to protect their mental vision. Thus, he next 

 tells us,t very properly, that "the apposite use of words 

 or phrases by talking birds are found on inquiry to be 

 due, as antecedently we should expect that they must, 

 to the principle of association. The bird hears a proper 

 name applied to a person, and so, on learning to say 

 the name, henceforth associates it with that person. 

 And similarly with phrases. These with talking birds 

 are mere vocal gestures, which in themselves present 

 but little more psychological significance than muscular 

 gestures. The verbal petition, * Scratch poor Poll,' does 

 not in itself display any further psychological develop- 

 ment than the significant gesture of depressing the head 

 against the bars of the cage." This is precisely what we 

 insist upon, and such articulations, like such movements, 



* p. 129. t See '' On Truth," p. 189. t p. 131- 



