IS6 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



desires, and is acquired by direct association." This is 

 really, though not formally, contradictory to what Mr. 

 Romanes has earlier most truly said,* that the nascent 

 intelligence first apprehends general characters, and 

 not particulars, which latter are only subsequently 

 detected by a process of mental analysis. Of course we 

 utterly deny that the first talking of a parrot and a 

 child is, or can be, due to a faculty which is ^'precisely 

 the same!' as we also deny that " in this stage language 

 is nothing more than vocal gesticulation." f It may or 

 it may not be " more," according to the circumstances. 



" Therefore," concludes Mr. Romanes, " we may now, 

 I think, take the position as established a posteriori as 

 well as a priori, that it is, so to speak, a mere accident 

 of anatomy that all the higher animals are not able thus 

 far to talk ; and that, if dogs or monkeys were able to 

 do so, we have no reason to doubt that their use of words 

 and phrases would be even more extensive and striking 

 than that which occurs in birds." 



This is true enough, and thus such emotional language 

 need mean no more in the case of a gorilla than it does 

 in that of a cockatoo. 



It would be an altogether different matter if animals 

 were really able to use names, knowing what they were 

 about, or could point out groups of objects under- 

 stood as such. This, however, is what Mr. Romanes 

 does not hesitate to say they can do. He tells us : 

 ' There still remains one feature in the psychology of 

 talking birds to which I must now draw pronTinent 

 attention. So far as I can ascertain, it has not been 



■^ pp. 64-67 ; see also above, p. 88. f P- i34' 



