REASON AND LANGUAGE. 173 



animals which present it," and yet only certain animals, 

 and only bats amongst the class of beasts, have attained 

 to it, though they all possess structures which might 

 be modified into organs of flight. *' Similarly," he 

 tells us, "'the flight of thought' is a most useful 

 faculty," but " it has only been developed in man." 

 The analogy we do not admit. The utility of flight is 

 as nothing compared with the utility of thought — as 

 the experience of each autumn abundantly demon- 

 strates in every county of England. A multitude of 

 unfavourable conditions might check the development 

 of wings, which would also be of little service to a 

 whale, an ant-eater, or a mole. But as regards 

 " thought," the case is not " similar" but quite other- 

 wise. Not only can we see no reason why anything 

 (disease or mutilation apart) should hinder its mani- 

 festation if it existed ; but we can also see that its 

 possession must be the greatest possible gain. Never- 

 theless there is no animal which shows a sign of 

 possessing it. Mr. Romanes himself says, ** it has only 

 been developed in man " ! Much mistaken, then, was 

 he when he wrote : " So far, then, as we have yet gone, 

 I do not anticipate that opponents will find it prudent 

 to take a stand." * 



Hereupon follow statements of the " exact meanings " 

 severally given by our author to what he terms (i) in- 

 dicative, (2) denotative, (3) connotative, (4) denomina- 

 tive, and (5) predicative language, f 



* p. 157. 



t He tells us (pp. 161, 162), "By an indicative sign I will 

 understand a significant tone or gesture intentionally expressive 



