174 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



Since our author does not, however, discriminate 

 between material and formal understanding, making 

 known, denominating, etc., his distinctions are useless, 

 and cannot be accepted by us. As critics, we need 

 only attend to them as far as may be necessary to 

 apprehend fully the author's meaning, and to scrupu- 

 lously avoid doing him a shadow of injustice. 



His ninth chapter, that on speech, is the one for 

 which, he tells us, * all his preceding chapters were 

 arranged, adding, mirahile dictii, " Therefore, as already 

 remarked, I have thus far presented material over which 

 I do not think it is possible that any dispute can 

 arise " ! 



As Mr. Romanes has adopted our classification of 

 language, we regret, for the sake of convenience, that he 

 did not, as we did, restrict his use of the term "speech" 

 to denote rational expression which is exclusively oral. 

 Mr. Romanes also includes under that term, rational 

 expression by gesture. Nevertheless, he truly says,t 



of a mental state ; but yet not in any sense of the word denomi- 

 native. 



" By a denotative sign I will understand the receptual marking 

 of particular objects, qualities, actions, etc. 



" By a connotative sign I will understand the classificatory 

 attribution of qualities to objects named by the sign, whether such 

 attribution be due to receptual or to conceptual operations of the 

 mind. 



" By a denommative sign I will understand a connotative sign 

 consciously bestowed as such, or with a full conceptual apprecia- 

 tion of its office and purpose as a name. 



" By a predicative sign I will mean a proposition, or the con- 

 ceptual apposition of two denominative terms, expressive of the 

 speaker's intention to connote something of the one by means of 

 the other." 



* p. 163. t p. 164- 



