176 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



He further objects * to our remark \ that when the 

 mind perceives the truth expressed in the principle of 

 contradiction, its intuition, or perception, is aided by 

 " images " or '' phantasmata " answering respectively to 

 " a thing being " and "a thing not being," " at the same 

 time " and " in the same sense," observing that such 

 images " must indeed be vague." There is here an im- 

 perfect description. The " images " are not the direct, 

 but only the indirect, support of the intuition. Its direct 

 support consists of " recognitions " of past perceptions 

 as to coexistences, and the recollections of the past 

 perceptions themselves repose upon reminiscences (phan- 

 tasmata) of the sensuous affections which first accom- 

 panied them. 



Thus, as we said, such sensuous images or phantas- 

 mata by no means constitute the intuition, though without 

 such sensuous elements underlying it and indirectly sup- 

 porting it, no such judgment or intuition could take place. 



Mr. Romanes, having misunderstood us to so extra- 

 ordinary an extent, very naturally objects % that the 



we are implicitly judging that the thing to which we apply the name 

 presents the attributes connoted by that name. ... To utter the 

 name Negro ... is to form and pronounce at least two judgments 

 ... to wit, that it is a man, and that he is black." Again, he 

 observes (p. 173) about our assertion that "the simplest element 

 of thought is a judgment," as follows : " Of course, if it were said 

 that these two faculties are one in kind — that in order to conceive 

 we must judge, and in order to name we must predicate — I should 

 have no objection to offer." Mr. Romanes could hardly justify our 

 assertion more completely than by such statements as these. As 

 to what is impHed in the term "negro," see " On Truth," p. 137. 



* p. 166 (note). 



t Made in the same address to the British Association. 



X p. 168. 



