REASON AND LANGUAGE. 177 



distinction between animal and human intelligence lies 

 in the power of " bestowing a name known as such " 

 and forming a concept. In this we quite agree with our 

 author, as also in his remark * that " in the very act of 

 naming we are virtually predicating existence of the 

 thing named," and that " the power to ' think is,' is the 

 power concerned in the formation of a concept ; " while 

 it is also concerned (in spite of Mr. Romanes's denial) 

 " in the apposing of concepts when formed." 



Mr. Romanes deniesf that the predication of existence 

 is the essential or any important part of a full, formally 

 expressed proposition. Rather, he tells us, " it is really 

 the least essential or the least important. For existence 

 is the category to which everything must belong if it is 

 to be judged about at all." But because it is a category 

 to which every actual thing must belong, it by no means 

 follows that it is an unimportant category. Mr. Romanes 

 might be deprived of objects and conditions belonging 

 to various categories which might not matter much to 

 him, but he could hardly say it was unimportant to him 

 whether or not he was deprived of existence! He 

 continues, " Merely to judge that A is and B iSy is to 

 form the most barren (or least significant) judgment that 

 can be formed with regard to A and B." Of course it 

 is manifest that so to affirm is to give the minimum of 

 information about A and B ; but though it tells little 

 as to extent, it tells us a truth of the most profound and 

 intensely important kind. Existence is an attribute 

 which clings to everything to the very last, and clings to 

 it in a certain form even when it has ceased actually to 

 * pp. 171, 172. t P- 172. 



N, 



