REASON AND LANGUAGE. 179 



existence of both A and B has been already presupposed 

 in the two concepts." But the two things thus coupled 

 can only be distinct ideally, since no two materially 

 distinct existences can really be identically the same. 

 We cannot say of two leaves the most alike to be found 

 in a whole forest, that one is the other. 



Mr. Romanes further contradicts himself expressly 

 when he says that " the proposition A is B " has nothing 

 to do with existence. For he has told us, " The exist- 

 ence both of A and B has been already presupposed 

 in the two concepts." But if " existence " is supposed 

 in each of the two concepts by itself, surely their con- 

 junction cannot immediately drive such existence out 

 of both of them ; and if not, at least as much existence 

 as was in them separately, must be present in the express 

 judgment their conjunction produces ! Mr. Romanes 

 will hardly try to explain this confusion of thought by 

 referring to his qualification " as such " in his phrase, 

 " The proposition A is B has really nothing to do with 

 existence as such!' Of course, no one is so absurd as to 

 pretend that when we say A is B, our main intention is 

 to call attention to, and to insist upon, the fact that A 

 exists and B exists. No one could possibly mean that 

 when we say, " A cat is a carnivorous beast," our main 

 intention is to call attention to, and insist upon, the 

 fact that a cat exists and a carnivorous beast exists. 

 The meaning of the predication we have just stated, 

 and we have truly stated also that existence is implied 

 therein. 



Every judgment, therefore, and every concept also, 

 implies existence. That each judgment, indeed, does so 



