i8o THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



must be admitted by every disciple of John Stuart Mill, 

 who tells us * that the apprehension of the truth of any 

 judgment we make is not only an essential part, but 

 the essential part, of it as a judgment : " Leave that out, 

 and it remains a mere play of thought on which no 

 judgment is passed." But if this is correct, every judg- 

 ment must have to do with existence ; for how can any- 

 thing be true which may not " be " at all ! When Mill 

 denies, in the passage cited by Mr. Romanes,! that the 

 copula in the affirmation, "Socrates is just," does not 

 signify existence, he either contradicts himself (which 

 is nothing new),t or he means that the signification of 

 existence lies not in the "is," but exclusively in one 

 or both of the two words, " Socrates," and "just " — which 

 would be a very singular assertion. The quotation from 

 Hobbes (so highly approved by Mill), to the effect that 

 " the placing two names in order may serve to signify 

 their consequence, if it were the custom, as well as the 

 words " 2>, to be^ and the like " is very true, but tells in 

 no way against our position. The word " is," is full, 

 indeed, of significance when it is used ; but it may be 

 perfectly well understood, and its meaning truly exist, 

 in sentences wherein no distinct word is set apart for 

 its expression. 



We repeat that we quite agree with Mr. Romanes in 

 saying that the distinction between man and brute con- 

 sists not in verbal predication, but in mental affirmation 

 or conception. " The subsequent working up of names 

 into propositions is merely a further exhibition of the 



* In his " Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 346. 

 t " Logic," vol. i. p. 86. % See " On Truth," p. 247. 



