i82 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



will allow, in the power which the human being displays 

 of objectifying ideas, or of setting one state of mind 

 before another state, and contemplating the relation 

 between them." To this we reply, it truly consists in 

 the power of " objectifying ideas " in the sense of per- 

 ceiving objects as real external existences, and so 

 forming ideas or concepts : not, be it observed, in recog- 

 nizing their objectivity; that is a further and a reflex act. 

 We mean only that direct ideal apprehension which an 

 ordinary child (who hardly yet reflects at all) enjoys 

 when objects present themselves to his senses while his 

 consciousness is not absorbed in other ways. Again, 

 we deny that "objectifying ideas" is equivalent, as Mr. 

 Romanes says, to "setting one state of mind before 

 another state, and contemplating the relation between 

 them." That is another very special kind of reflex 

 mental act, and its presence is by no means necessary 

 for the existence of true conception. 



He adds, " The power to * think is ' — or, as I should 

 prefer to state it, the power to think at all — is the power 

 which is given by introspective reflection in the light of 

 self -consciousness y But the power "to think at all " 

 must exist before " introspective reflection," or else the 

 latter could never come into existence. If we never 

 had any conscious ideas directly, how could we ever 

 know by reflection that >ve had them ? Such a reflex 

 act is strictly a recognition, or a " consciously knowing 

 over again " what we have " consciously known before." 

 We could never learn by reflection that we had known 

 what we had never been conscious of ; for had we been 

 unconscious of it, we could not have known it. It is 



