1 84 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



make known its intellectual perception and conception 

 of a bear, and these, as we shall see later on, might per- 

 fectly exist before the mind — by the help of imagined 

 bodily motions — without the need of the imagination of 

 any word. Apart from the intellectual faculty, the vocal 

 gestures would be as conceptually meaningless as any 

 other bodily gesture. They would remain simple re- 

 cepts, and could never become " concepts." According 

 to Mr. Romanes,* however, "concepts differ from 

 recepts in that they are recepts which have themselves 

 become objects of knowledge ; " and he adds, in a note, 

 that some concepts "may be the knowledge of other 

 concepts." But even as to the first kind, he tells us 

 that the condition of their existence " is the presence of 

 self-consciousness in the percipient mind." Here Mr. 

 Romanes suffers from his failure to distinguish between 

 direct " consciousness " and reflex " self-consciousness." 

 Concepts, we affirm, are never recepts, though they are 

 elicited by groups of sense-impressions ; and what he calls 

 concepts of concepts, are concepts due to our conscious 

 recognition (but not reflection on the fact of recognition) 

 of former perceptions of our intellectual faculty. 



Mr. Romanes next states his reasons for denying a 

 difference of kind between the psychical powers of man 

 and brute, by "a careful analysis of conceptual judgment." 



First, he addresses himself to the task of doing away 

 with any distinction as regards naming. He tells us,t 

 " When a parrot calls a dog bow-wow (as a parrot, like 

 a child, may easily be taught to do), the parrot may be 

 said, in one sense of the word, to be naming the dog ; 

 * P- 176. t p. 179. 



