REASON AND LANGUAGE. 187 



qualities," although by the unconscious use of a name 

 it may make us, who are conscious, recognize the fact 

 that certain qualities are present. He tell us * that 

 " it is obviously most imperative for the purposes of 

 this [his] analysis to draw a distinction between con- 

 notation as receptual and conceptual." It is, indeed, most 

 imperative, and the distinction consists in this : that re- 

 ceptual connotation is connotation improperly so called, 

 while conceptual connotation alone deserves the name. 

 The uniting together of these two psychical activities 

 under one general generic term is most misleading, and 

 again practically begs the question which Mr. Romanes 

 has to prove. However, he draws a further distinction, 

 which we are anxious to give him the full benefit of. He 

 says, " This distinction I have drawn by assigning the 

 word denomination to all connotation which is of a truly 

 conceptual nature — or to the bestowing of names con- 

 sciously recognized as such^ If by " as such " he does not 

 mean a reflex cognition that the name is a name, and so 

 intended ; but only that there is a direct consciousness 

 of naming, as of every other act, then we accept this 

 very cordially. Thus, as he truly says,t "the whole 

 question is narrowed - down to a clearing up of the 

 relations which obtain between connotation as receptual 

 and conceptual — or between connotation that is, and 

 connotation that is not, denominative." 



He begins by considering what he calls " an instance 



of undenominative or receptual connotation in the case 



of a young child." Of course it is obvious that a child 



at birth is not able to form judgments, as also that its 



* p. 180. t p. 180. 



