i88 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



latent intellectual nature is called forth into manifesta- 

 tation by the incidence of sense-impressions. This we 

 all agree in asserting. We say, however (as we laid 

 down in our introduction), that the ultimate outcome 

 proves the intellectual energy to have been latent from 

 the first. 



Mr. Romanes truly asserts that * "analogies which do 

 not strike animals strike men." A child will say Bow- 

 wow successively of the house-dog, all other dogs, toy- 

 dogs, models of dogs, and pictures of dogs. He adds t 

 that in this "we have a clear exhibition, in a simple 

 form, of the development of a connotative name within 

 the purely receptual sphere." But this we altogether 

 deny. Such naming by the child is truly and formally 

 conceptual. Instead, then, of its being "absurd to suppose 

 that the child was thus raising the name Bow-wow to 

 any conceptual value," it would be absurd to suppose it 

 was not the sign of a direct universal \ and a perfect 

 concept. It is true that for this purpose, as Mr. 

 Romanes says,§ " there is no need for any introspective 

 regarding of the name as a name ; " there is, indeed, 

 no need of any such reflex action, in order that a perfect 

 concept may exist. All that is needed is that direct con- 

 sciousness which accompanies all our ordinary mental 

 activity, without our at all adverting to it. Truly may 

 Mr. Romanes say, "Nevertheless, it is evident that 

 already the child has done more than the parrot." 



" Names," indeed, " may be . . . connotative in the 

 absence of self-consciousness," that is, of reflex con- 



* p. i8i. t p. i8i. 



X See "On Truth," p. 206. § p. 182. 



