REASON AND LANGUAGE. 189 



sciousness, but direct consciousness there must be, other- 

 wise the names only connote practically and materially 

 — as a sieve* practically and materially sorts. Such sort- 

 ing, however, is fundamentally different from the sorting 

 performed by a man. Mr. Romanes urges,t "If we say 

 that a child is connoting resemblances when it extends 

 the name Bow-wow from a particular dog to dogs in 

 general, clearly we say the same thing of a parrot when 

 we find that thus far it goes with the child." No asser- 

 tion could well be less warranted than this one. The 

 material resemblance between the two cases need mean 

 no more than the material resemblance between, say, a 

 sentence as spoken by a parrot, and the same sentence 

 as spoken by a grown man. 



To serve his purpose and explain his meaning fully, 

 Mr. Romanes distinguishes J four classes of psychical 

 acts as follows : — 



" (i) Lower ReceptSy comprising the mental life of all 

 the lower animals, and so including such powers of re- 

 ceptual connotation as a child when first emerging from 

 infancy shares with a parrot. 



"(2) Higher Recepts^ comprising all the extensive 

 tract of ideation that belongs to a child between the 

 time when its powers of receptual connotation first 

 surpass those of a parrot, up to the age at which 

 connotation, as merely denotative, begins to become also 

 denominative. 



"(3) Lower Concepts, comprising the province of 

 conceptual ideation where this first emerges from the 



* See above, pp. 64, 67. t P- 183. 



X pp. 184, 185. 



