I90 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



higher receptual, up to the point where denominative 

 connotation has to do, not merely with the naming of 

 recepts, but also with that of associated concepts. 



"(4) Higher Concepts^ comprising 'all the further 

 excellencies of human thought" 



For us, as before said,* the first of these four 

 categories belongs to merely sensitive, consentional life. 

 All the other three are fully and truly conceptual. Mr. 

 Romanes seems to have some inkling of this from the 

 fact that he proposes f to term his Higher Recepts, Pre- 

 concepts, although he deems that they mark a stage of 

 psychical life anterior to the advent of concepts and 

 consciousness. He asks where else can he place the 

 limit between brute and man except at the point *' where 

 the naming powers of a child demonstrably excel those 

 of a parrot or any other brute," and he adds,t " If 

 this place happens to be before the rise of conceptual 

 powers, I am not responsible for the fact." Nor, of 

 course, is he. He is only responsible for making the 

 mistake of considering such children as being "below 

 the use of the conceptual powers," when they are nothing 

 of the kind. 



Having made this statement as to concepts, Mr. 

 Romanes naturally proceeds to extend his distinction 

 to judgments, and classifies them § " as receptual, 

 pre-conceptual, and conceptual." By the first, he 

 says, II he means the "practical inferences" allowed 

 by us to animals. "Also," he tells us,1[ "if a brute 

 which is able to name each of two recepts separately 



* See above, pp. 56, 59. f p. 185. J p. 186. 



§ p. 189. II p. 191- 1 P- 189- 



