REASON AND LANGUAGE. 191 



(as is done by a talking bird), were to name the two 

 recepts simultaneously when thus combined in an act 

 of 'practical inference/ although there would then be 

 the outward semblance of a proposition, we should not 

 be strictly right in calling it a proposition. It would, 

 indeed, be the statement of a truth perceived ; but not 

 the statement of a truth perceived as true!' • But in a 

 true and formal judgment we need by no means dis- 

 tinctly advert to its truth, though it must implicitly con- 

 tain the idea of truth, as Mill says. And if such a judg- 

 ment of a brute did this, which it must do if it stated 

 a \x\x\S\ perceived, it would be a true, formal, conceptual 

 judgment. But the junction of two things felt as 

 related, is by no means what we mean by a " practical 

 inference." As we before pointed out,* such an infer- 

 ence is only the revival of certain sensuous elements in 

 the imagination, occasioned by the fresh occurrence of 

 certain actual sensations, whereof such imagined ones 

 were, in past experience, the complement. We are con- 

 fident, moreover, that no brute ever united vocal or 

 other gestures so as to form the semblance of a pro- 

 position. Mr. Romanes, indeed, tells us " that this pos- 

 sibility of receptual predication on the part of talking 

 birds is not entirely hypothetical, and then proceeds to 

 cite, as evidence in his favour, the absurd tale about 

 the cockatoo " Cockie " which was before t quoted and 

 commented on. 



We find it thus quite easy "to meet " Mr. Romanes's 

 contention, although he thinks we shall not find it % an 

 easy task so to do. We also venture to think that we 



* See above, p. 63. t See above, p. 136. % p. 191. 



