192 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



have made good our complaint by showing that " there 

 is something wrong in " his " psychological analysis." 



He finally tells us,* " In the result, I claim to have 

 shown that if it is possible to suggest a difference of 

 kind between any of the levels of ideation which have 

 now been defined, this can only be done where the advent 

 of self-consciousness enables a mind, not only to know, 

 but to know that it knows ; not only to receive knowledge, 

 but also to conceive it ; not only to connotate, but also 

 to denominate ; not only to state a truth, but also to 

 state that truth as true^ The advent of the faculty of 

 intellect does, we hold, enable the mind to do all this, 

 but it is enough to show its presence if this be done 

 with direct consciousness ; a reflex act of consciousness 

 not being necessary to prove the presence of intellect. 



To make our relative position clear, Mr. Romanes's 

 views and our own may be contrasted in a tabular form 

 as follows :— 



His Our 



Percepts, Perception = Sencepts, Senception. 



Lower Recept = Sensuous cognitions. 



Higher Recept = Concepts and percepts as made known 



by the gestures of young children. 



Lower Concepts = Concepts and percepts as made known 



by speech or the gestures of adults. 



Higher Concepts = Conceptions concerning matters pre- 



viously apprehended. 



Receptual naming = The mere unintentional, accidental 



making known of facts to intel- 

 lectual onlookers. 



Pre-conceptual judgments = Judgments as made known by the 



gestures of young children. 



Conceptual judgments = Judgments of more developed minds, 



as expressed by either speech or 

 voiceless gesture. 



