196 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



declares * " that in the datum of self-consciousness we 

 each of us possess, not merely our only ultimate know- 

 ledge, or that which only is * real in its own right,' but 

 likewise the mode of existence which alone the human 

 mind is capable of conceiving as existence, and there- 

 fore the conditio sine qua non to the possibility of an 

 external world." 



This is going too far : it is impossible, with reason, 

 to affirm absolutely that the self-consciousness known 

 to us by introspection is the only entity which is " real 

 in its own right." Neither is it true to say that we 

 cannot conceive of a world without self-consciousness. 

 Of course, being always self-conscious when thinking, 

 we cannot thinlc of a world without consciousness, save 

 by the help of consciousness — -in other words, we cannot 

 think without thought. To say this, however, is trivial. 

 Although we cannot think without thought, we can 

 none the less conceive of the absence of self-conscious- 

 ness from the world, as is shown by the fact that there 

 have been and are thinkers who profess materialism ; 

 as well as Idealists who, with Hegel, held that God 

 becomes conscious of Himself in man. 



We have already referred to a mistake made by 

 Mr. Romanes as to what are the necessary conditions 

 and effects of self-consciousness. This error appears 

 most plainly developed in the present chapter. Therein 

 he most truly observes that it is only in man that we 

 can study the gradual manifestation of consciousness, 

 but it is especially unfortunate that he seems here to 



* p. 194. Readers should study Prof. Veitch's excellent work, 

 " Knowing and Being," recently published. 



