REASON AND CONSCIOUSNESS. 201 



have such perceptions and intuitions as those here 

 attributed to them, is, of course, most obvious ; but their 

 actions, nevertheless, do not afford us any proof that they 

 ever experience " perception " or form an " intuition " of 

 any sort or kind whatever. Mr. Romanes quotes M. 

 Quatrefages's relation, of an experience such as we are 

 all more or less familiar with-^namely, a dog playing 

 with his master, and only biting him most tenderly. 

 As to this M. Quatrefages says, " In reality it played a 

 part in a comedy, and we cannot act without being con- 

 scious of it." To this assertion we reply, " We, indeed, 

 cannot, but a mastiff may, and nothing in the tale 

 appears to us in the least to indicate a faculty higher 

 than that consentience we assign, in different degrees, 

 to a mastiff and an earth-worm." Mr. Romanes follows 

 up this citation with another extraordinary, gratuitous 

 assertion. He says, " It is of importance further to 

 observe that at this stage of mental evolution the 

 individual — whether an animal or an infant — so far 

 realizes its own individuality as to be informed by the 

 logic of recepts that it is one of a kind. I do not mean 

 that at this stage the individual realizes its own or 

 any other individuality as such ; but merely that it re- 

 cognizes the fact of its being one among a number of 

 similiar though distinct forms of life." This we strenu- 

 ously deny. There is no shadow of reason for asserting 

 that any animal " recognizes " any " fact," though, of 

 course, it is manifest that their various feelings lead 

 them to act in ways to a certain superficial extent 

 similar to the ways in which creatu;'es like ourselves would 

 act. Many very lowly animals go in troops, and, of 



