202 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



course, their movements are guided by feelings which 

 differ according as such movements relate to them- 

 selves, to organisms of the same kind or to organisms of 

 other kinds. " In this way," he tells us,* " there arises a 

 sort of 'outward self consciousness,' which differs from 

 true or inward self-consciousness only in the absence 

 of any attention being directed upon the inward mental 

 states as such." But true self-consciousness by no 

 means needs for its existence that it should be " directed 

 upon the inward mental states at all," and, a fortiori, 

 it does not need that it should be ** directed upon the 

 inward mental states as such.'' He goes on,t "This 

 outward self-consciousness is known to us all, even in 

 adult life — it being but comparatively seldom that we 

 pause in our daily activities to contemplate the mental 

 processes of which these activities are the expression." 

 In order to avoid confusion, it may be well here to 

 enumerate the states of consciousness that really exist. 

 We have : — 



(i) Reflex consciousness concerning our mental pro- 

 cesses as such, as, e.g., that in thinking, " That man is 

 probably a thief," we are making an " act of judgment." 



(2) Reflex consciousness as to what we think, but 

 not as to the nature of our mental process itself, as 

 when we say, " / do think that man is a thief" 



(3) Direct consciousness, as when we think a man 

 a thief, without adverting to the fact that we think so at 

 all, and still less advert to the fact that in so thinking 

 we are making a judgment. 



But besides these states of consciousness, we may 

 * p. 199. t Ibid. 



