REASON AND CONSCIOUSNESS. 203 



also perform a variety of movements, often complex, 

 owing to the incidence of sensations in the arousing of 

 emotions without consciousness, and such mere results 

 of sensitivity have been distinguished by Mr. Lewes 

 and ourselves * as consentience, which we freely allow to 

 animals, and deem amply sufficient to account for all 

 their highest psychical states and the various external 

 manifestations thereof 



Mr. Romanes, on the other hand, fails to distinguish 

 between direct self - consciousness and consentience, 

 saying, t "Receptual or outward self-consciousness, then, 

 is the practical recognition of self as an active and a 

 feeling agent ; while conceptual or inward self-conscious- 

 ness is the introspective recognition of self as an object 

 of knowledge, and, therefore, as a subject." We repeat, 

 direct consciousness is not introspective. It does not 

 think without knowing what it thinks about, but with- 

 out expressly directing its attention to what it is doing. 

 In a note Mr. Romanes quotes from Wundt as replying 

 " to the objection that there can be no thought without 

 knowledge of thought," by saying, " that before there 

 is any knowledge of thought there must be the same 

 order of thinking as there is of perceiving, prior to the 

 advent of self-consciousness." But we deny that there 

 is any " perception " without consciousness other than 

 mere "sense-perception ;" which is only called perception 

 by analogy. Probably Wundt means that before reflex 

 thought, there must be direct thought, which is true ; as 

 well as that before we can think even directly, there 

 must be antecedent sensitivity in exercise, which is also 



* See "On Truth," pp. 183, 354. t pp. 199, 200. 



