REASON AND CONSCIOUSNESS. 205 



as " Jimmy," it is absurd to suppose he does not under- 

 stand that he is Jimmy, and that Jimmy is himself. 



Mr. Romanes really attaches an altogether absurd 

 importance to the saying of "I." We cannot, of 

 course, intelligently say it without having a concept 

 of self, but we cannot intelligently say anything else 

 without having a concept thereof. The idea of self 

 is by no means so exceptionally gifted that it alone 

 of all things is able to evoke mental conception. Any 

 object indicated by either voice or gesture as being 

 one of a kind, or being in any particular state, is the 

 result of a concept, and the index of the presence of 

 "conceptual ideation." If a thing is not known to be of 

 any kind or in any state at all, it is not known, but if it 

 is understood, it must be understood by the medium of 

 a concept. Any object whatever will serve to give rise 

 to a concept equally well with the object " self," to which 

 Mr. Romanes thus attributes such factitious importance. 



He further observes, * " It will no doubt be on all 

 hands freely conceded, that at least up to the time when 

 a child begins to speak it has no beginning of any 

 true or introspective consciousness of self." 



We concede nothing of the kind, but rather think 

 that in all cases self-consciousness precedes, and may 

 for a long time f precede, speech. 



Anecdotes of child-language will be more con- 

 veniently considered in our next chapter, but we cannot 



* p. 202. 



t Amongst my own friends I know a very striking instance in 

 confirmation of this. A youth (now a very distinguished medical 

 man) was long unable to speak after he was able to express most 

 plainly by gesture-language, what related to his own individuality. 



