212 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



Wundt says, " It is only after the child has distin- 

 guished by definite characteristics its own being from 

 that of other people, that it makes the further advance 

 of perceiving that these other people are also beings 

 in and for themselves." This Mr. Romanes quotes, 

 adding, very remarkably, " Now, this I do not question, 

 although I do not think there can be much before or 

 after in these two concepts." This sentence is indeed 

 remarkable^ since Wundt's position is simply fatal to 

 that of Mr. Romanes. However quickly the idea of 

 other people may come after the idea of self, the fact 

 of such ideas coming after at all is absolutely fatal to 

 the idea that what precedes them can be due to them 

 and composed of them. Whether or not Wundt is justi- 

 fied in saying that a child must first distinguish its 

 own being by definite characteristics, we regard it as 

 absolutely certain that it could not have a conception 

 of other people without also having a conception of 

 itself also. 



Nothing in Mr. Romanes's chapter on self-conscious- 

 ness, even tends to show us how the gulf between 

 mere sensitivity and intellect can be bridged over ; or 

 how consciousness can have arisen by any natural pro- 

 cess whatever. We have, of course, long known that 

 there are certain conditions antecedently necessary for 

 its manifestation in man — such as mechanical forces, 

 chemical energies, life, and sensitivity — but none or all 

 of these suffice to explain consciousness, the origin of 

 which remains shrouded in mystery as inscrutable to 

 mere physical science as the origin of sensitivity, life, 

 or physical energy itself We see it there, where it 



