REASON AND THE INFANT. 225 



a most simple topographical problem by means of her 

 lowly developed conceptual faculties) was assuredly much 

 less than that which afterwards separated the intelligence 

 of my child from this level of its own previous self." 



Now, as to the cebus, etc., we have already made our 

 criticism. But the answer to all this is given by Mr. 

 Romanes himself a few lines later on, where he says 

 (in words already quoted by us), " The greatest of all 

 distinctions in biology, when it first arises, is thus seen 

 to lie in hs potentiality ." Once more, that is just it. It is, 

 as we just said, the distinction between a nature which 

 can, and a nature which cannot, possess conceptual 

 power. Mr. Romanes completes his sentence by adding 

 the words, "rather than in origin." The meaning of 

 these words is not clear. By this "potentiality" in 

 which he declares lies the greatness of a distinction, 

 he must mean the nature thus distinguished ; for the 

 ^^potentiality" cannot lie in " the distinction itself ^ With 

 this we fully agree. We have no objection to say also 

 that such distinction lies more in the nature of an organ- 

 ism than in its origin. The distinction between a living 

 man and a brute does, perhaps, lie rather in the distinct- 

 ness of his nature from theirs than in his origin. For 

 it is conceivable that the immaterial, psychical principle 

 of any brute might have been formed by a distinct 

 kind of action, as has been that of man ; but this simi- 

 larity of origin would be of small account compared to 

 the difference between these principles as regards their 

 potentiality. On the other hand, had the human body 

 been formed separately, but not endowed with a rational, 

 but merely with a sentient nature, such a diversity of 



