226 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



origin from the mode of origin of a brute would be 

 of no account compared with the diversity between their 

 innermost natures as revealed by their divergent capa- 

 cities. This, however, cannot have been Mr. Romanes's 

 meaning in the sentence quoted, which is certainly a 

 very obscure one. 



(B) His second supplementary consideration refers * 

 to the fact " that even in the case of a fully developed 

 self-conscious intelligence, both receptual and precon- 

 ceptual ideation continue to play an important part." 

 But this is what his opponents have ever distinctly 

 affirmed, and we have reaffirmed it in our introductory 

 chapter. Man is a sensitive organism ; an organism 

 possessing vegetative powers ; a theatre of chemical 

 changes, and a material substance manifesting physical 

 properties— man is all this — as well as an intellectual 

 being. Moreover, as we have also pointed out again and 

 again, we have both consentience and simple, or direct, 

 consciousness, as well as reflex consciousness. Mr. 

 Romanes says,t " When I say, 'A negro is black,' I do 

 not require to think all the formidable array of things 

 that Mr. Mivart says I affirm." Certainly not! Neverthe- 

 less, whoever so affirms, affirms these things implicitly, and 

 a very little examination suffices to show they were, and 

 must have been latent, and to make their existence patent.J 



Certainly there is no need that we should "examine 

 our own ideas " whenever we use rational language 

 — direct knowledge, or consciousness, is enough to 



* p. 234. t p. 235. 



X See " On Truth," p. 103, for implications contained in the 

 assertion, " That is a horse." 



