248 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



ever this may be, the quotation affords an admirable 

 example of the cheap and easy way in which the in- 

 tellectual processes of different races of mankind are 

 disposed of as may happen to suit the purpose of the 

 disposers. The utterer of ni ne is just as rational 

 essentially as Prof. Sayce or the present writer. 

 We have in our own language precisely similar phe- 

 nomena. The expression, " My work," may signify 

 either " I do it," or " You do not^' according to the 

 context and the gestures or tones of the speaker. A 

 man may say, " My work,'' pointing to the product with 

 a look showing lively satisfaction at being able to boast 

 himself as the performer of so remarkable a feat. He 

 may say, " My work " while pointing to his own body, 

 with a look showing strong disapprobation at the idea 

 of another person pretending to have been the doer of it. 



We have no desire to affirm the existence of any 

 original distinction between adjectives and substantives 

 as regards words, though we are quite sure it existed 

 as to meanings as it does to-day in a multitude of 

 instances — such, e.g., as "cannon-ball" and "pocket- 

 book," in which a word is not only, as Mr. Romanes 

 says,* an adjective "in virtue of" "position," but in 

 virtue of the intention of the utterer of it. As Prof. 

 Max Miiller very truly observes, f adjectives are out- 

 wardly like substantives, but " are conceived as different 

 from substantives the moment they are used in a 

 sentence for the purpose of predicating or of qualifying 

 a substantive." 



Such terms % as "digging-he " to express a labourer, 

 * P- 305- t p. 306. X See p. 307. 



