REASON AND DIVERS TONGUES, 251 



only four pages further on,* he declares unequivocally 

 that existence can be signified and made plain by 

 expressions which nevertheless do not denote it by a 

 separate term. 



Then he goes on,t "In order to prove that the 

 substantive verb is really very far from primitive, I will 

 furnish a few extracts from the writings of philological 

 authorities upon the subject." He then tells us that the 

 Hebrew word Kama means primitively "to stand out," 

 and that the verb Koum, "to stand," passes into the 

 sense of " being." But what more could we require ? 

 Does Mr. Romanes think we suppose that primitive 

 man started a word to denote abstract existence without 

 any other meaning accompanying it } We are far 

 indeed from entertaining such a notion. Again, the 

 Sanskrit ^^--w/ (the foundation of all the Indo-European 

 words denoting " to be ") is declared to be " but a forma- 

 tion on the demonstrative pronoun sa^ the idea meant 

 to be conveyed being simply that of local presence." 

 But what then? How does the use of the term to 

 denote " local presence " deprive it of the power of 

 denoting "existence"? Is "existence" inconsistent 

 with " local presence " ? In order that a thing may be 

 present anywhere, is it absolutely needful that it should 

 not exist at all f 



" May we not then," says Mr. Romanes, " ask 

 with Bunsen, ' What is to be in all languages but the 

 spiritualization of walking or standing or eating? ' " To 

 this we reply, Certainly you may so ask, and a rational 

 man will probably give some such answer as the follow- 



* p. 312. t P- 309- 



