252 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



ing one : " What are we to understand by your use of 

 the term ^spiritualization ' ? Is it a hocus pocus, by 

 which you would slip in an intellectual signification 

 into what is merely sensuous?" We think it better to 

 use a less equivocal term. We say, first, that actual 

 real material "walking, standing, and eating" neces- 

 sarily imply existence in whatever walks, stands, or eats. 

 Secondly, we say that the ideas of "walking, standing, and 

 eating " necessarily carry with them the idea of existence 

 as therein implicitly contained. Thirdly, we say that 

 " to be " in all languages is much more than an implicit 

 signification contained in " walking, standing, or eating ; " 

 for it is contained really in every other real action 

 and object, and ideally and implicitly in every other 

 ideal action or object, as in the three actions which 

 Bunsen selected. If it be rejoined, what was meant was 

 simply that in most or all languages which have not the 

 substantive verb itself, its place is supplied by an 

 extension or specialization of meaning applied to the 

 three terms given, we further reply that we are very 

 happy it should be so. We have not the philological 

 knowledge requisite to affirm or deny the assertion, 

 which is an interesting one from a philological point of 

 view, but has no special interest for us, being utterly 

 beside the question under consideration. 



Mr. Romanes then quotes from Mr. Garnett (" On 

 the Nature and Analysis of the Verb "), very much to 

 our satisfaction, as that writer quite expresses our own 

 view. The only important matter, as Mr. Romanes has 

 said,* is what a man means, and if he means to predi- 



* p. 164. 



