256 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



men are bipeds/ we have two ideas, * all men ' and * an 

 equal number of bipeds/ or, more tersely, * as many- 

 men, as many bipeds,' and we think of the two ideas 

 simultaneously {i.e., in apposition), not one after the other, 

 as we are forced to express them in speech." But who 

 supposes that our thoughts are bound to follow the order 

 which may be necessary for expression ? Only a 

 Nominalist would be guilty of such an absurdity. 

 Besides this, the statement is doubly erroneous : it errs 

 both by excess and defect. We have no need of the 

 conception of equality of numbers, or of any numerical 

 relation at all, in thinking " all men are bipeds." On 

 the other hand, the ideas of coexistence and identity 

 are absolutely essential. In the form which Mr. 

 Romanes gives, however, these ideas of coexistence and 

 identity have no place. The words " as many men, as 

 many bipeds " are quite insufficient to express the 

 notion " all men are bipeds." " As many X, as many 

 Y " might mean things existing in succession, or coexist- 

 ing, but distinct in kind. Thus, in speaking of trains of 

 railway carriages, we may say, "As many foremost 

 vehicles, so many hindmost vehicles," or we may say, 

 of sheep in a flock, "As many sheeps' heads, as many 

 sheeps' tails." But in saying, " All men are bipeds," we 

 mean that the men actually are identical with the bipeds 

 supposed, and that they all were, are, and will be bipeds, 

 twofootedness and humanity being recognized as coexist- 

 ing. Therefore the idea of " existence " forms a neces- 

 sary part of the notion, and, however its expression may 

 be suppressed, must be present in the conception if it is 

 not to be meaningless. Therefore the author cited is 



