26o THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



course it is, and we affirm that this is manifestly an 

 utterly different thing from confounding recepts and 

 concepts. 



Again, he asks, will we affirm that " even in the 

 earlier and hitherto undifferentiated sentence-word we 

 have that faculty of predication on which is founded 

 the distinction between man and brute"? and we reply 

 most certainly we do. He next declares.* that if we 

 answer as we have just answered, " the following brief 

 considerations will be sufficient to dislodge " us. " If," 

 he says, " the term * predication ' is extended from a 

 conceptual proposition to a sentence-word, it thereby 

 becomes deprived of that distinctive meaning upon 

 which alone [as he supposes] the whole argument of my 

 opponents is reared. For, when used by a young child 

 (or primitive man;, sentence-words require to be supple- 

 mented by gesture-signs in order to particularize their 

 meaning, or to complete the ' predication.' But, where 

 such is the case, there is no longer any psychological 

 distinction between speaking and pointing: if this is 

 called predication, then the predicative 'category of 

 language ' has become identified with the indicative : 

 man and brute are conceded to be ' brothers.' " 



This is an entire mistake. The use or need of gesture 

 does not make language a bit less truly conceptual and 

 abstract. There is no psychological distinction between 

 speaking and pointing, or we could have no expression 

 of abstract ideas by pantomime as in ballets. Mr. 

 Romanes, as an example in point, tells us f of an infant 

 of his still unable to articulate a word, but who, having 



* P- 324. t p. 324. 



