270 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



two terms, though identical in sound and appearance, 

 denote two very different concepts or universals — as 

 truly as the term " trumpeter " respectively stands for 

 the two very distinct concepts — a man and a pigeon. 



**No one," he says,* "will maintain that the sentence- 

 words of young children exhibit the highest elaborations 

 of conceptual thought, on the ground that they present 

 the highest degree of ' generality,' which it is possible 

 for articulate sounds to express." Indeed ! we reply. 

 We ourselves will maintain it, and stoutly, too, if Mr. 

 Romanes considers the word " thing," as used by young 

 children, to be a " sentence-word." Naturally he denies 

 to early man what he thus denies to the child. Just as 

 naturally we affirm that primitive man in a sentence- 

 word, even if thought out only by the aid of gesture, 

 may, nay, must have, attained to concepts of the very 

 highest generality, though, of course, neither the child, 

 the ancient man, nor the modern peasant, recognizes its 

 nature and generality by a reflex mental act We alto- 

 gether, then, deny the distinction which Mr. Romanes 

 seeks to establish between generic and general ideas, 

 other than the distinction (which is profound indeed) 

 between (i) general ideas and (2) psychical states which 

 are no ideas at all, but the mere unconscious, consen- 

 tient energies named by us " Sensuous Universals." 



The next point urged by Mr. Romanes is the re- 

 semblance which he affirms to exist between the syntax 

 of gesture-language, that of baby-talk, and what he 

 therefore assumes to have been the mode of speech of 

 primitive man. This we do not in the least care to 



* p. 338. 



