REASON AND DIVERS TONGUES. 277 



any name for tree there can be no conception of tree." 

 But his opponents, as he ought to know, are most 

 ardent opponents of Nominalism, which they regard as 

 a most unreasonable philosophy. 



Finally, we must traverse the conclusions with 

 which Mr. Romanes ends this chapter, because, as 

 we have more than once observed, the need of adding 

 bodily and facial expression to voice, in no way 

 destroys the conceptual character of language, while 

 *' sentence-words " are so far from being non-concep- 

 tual that, as we have said, an ideally perfect language 

 would consist of nothing but monosyllabic sentence- 

 words. Neither can we regard names, due to onoma- 

 topoeia, as less truly conceptual than any of the 

 terms which Mr. Romanes has freshly coined for this 

 work, nor need metaphorical expressions, derived from 

 such onomatopoetic terms, be less truly conceptual 

 than metaphoric expression derived from other sources. 

 We have also pointed out how the placing two terms 

 in apposition, as in saying A B, may truly constitute 

 an essential predication, and involve the presence of 

 self-conscious intellect, as truly as saying A is B. 



Mr. Romanes asks,* " Will it be maintained that the 

 man-like being who was then [i.e., before spoken lan- 

 guage was used] unable to communicate with his fellows 

 by means of any words at all was gifted with self-con- 

 sciousness .? " To which we reply, supposing man did 

 primitively exist in such a condition (which we regard 

 as a mere groundless speculation), he certainly tuas 

 " gifted with self-consciousness." 



* p. 356. 



