28o THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



Nor if sentence-words could not be understood without 

 the accompaniment of gesture, did such gesture in the 

 least deprive them of their intellectual, conceptual 

 nature. Assuming, for argument's sake, that the gram- 

 matical structure of spoken-language was originally 

 the offspring of gesture-signs, its intellectual character 

 is in no way thereby destroyed. Nor was early man, 

 any more than the child of to-day, a bit less truly 

 self-conscious, if he spoke of himself exclusively 

 in what we call the third person. We find in all 

 languages (other than emotional), whether of word or 

 of gesture, just that sensuous accompaniment which 

 reason and observation combine to show us must be 

 present in every external expression of the meanings 

 of an intellectual animal like man, because it must be 

 present beside his internal thought, since we can never 

 think without phantasmata. On the one hand, every 

 act of our intellect needs a sensuous accompaniment, 

 which must have preceded it ; while, on the other hand, 

 every perception of, and through our senses, contains 

 what is altogether beyond sense. If, then, it is true in 

 this sense to say, " Nihil in intellectu quod non prius 

 fuerit in sensul' it is no less true to say, " Nihil in 

 intellectu quod unquam fuerit in sensu." So also if in 

 one sense we say, with Garnett, " Nihil in oratione quod 

 non prius in sensu!' we must none the less also say in 

 another sense, " Nihil in oratione quod prius in sensu!' 



The impossibility of the evolution of intellect from 

 speech having been recognized through the recognition 

 of what "thought" really is, we see how only "the 

 flippant and the ignorant " can deem such agencies as 



