288 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



fiothmg in bringing about any change of the kind ; 

 whereas, if intellect could be thus introduced at all, it 

 might have made its subsequent progress at a relatively 

 very rapid rate. 



But we must let Mr. Romanes describe in his own 

 words the stages by which he is disposed to think the 

 progress of mental evolution from the brute to man 

 most probably took place. His words are * : — 



" Starting from the highly intelligent and social 

 species of anthropoid ape, as pictured by Darwin, we 

 can imagine that this animal was accustomed to use its 

 vtice freely for the expression of its emotions, uttering 

 of danger-signals, and singing. Possibly enough, also, 

 it may have been sufficiently intelligent to use a few 

 imitative sounds in the arbitrary way that Mr. Darwin 

 suggests ; and certainly sooner or later the receptual 

 life of this social animal must have advanced far enough 

 to have become comparable with that of an infant at 

 about two years of age. That is to say, this animal, 

 although not yet having begun to use articulate signs, 

 must have advanced far enough in the conventional use 

 of natural signs (or signs with a natural origin in tone 

 and gesture, whether spontaneous only or intentionally 

 imitative), to have admitted of a tolerably free exchange 

 of receptual ideas, such as would be co,ncerned in animal 

 wants, and even, perhaps, in the simplest forms of 

 co-operative action. Next, I think it probable that the 

 advance of receptual intelligence which would have 

 been occasioned by this advance in sign-making, would 

 in turn have led to a further development of the latter — 



* p. 377. 



