290 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



significant sounds and movements, both as to number 

 and variety ; but in all probability we should scarcely 

 have been able to notice the already developing germ 

 of articulation. Nor do I believe that, if we were able to 

 strike in again upon the history tens of thousands of years 

 later, we should find that pantomime had been super- 

 seded by speech. On the contrary, I believe we should 

 find that, although considerable progress had been made 

 in the former, so that the object then before us might 

 appear deserving of being classed as Homo, we should 

 also feel that he must needs still be distinguished by the 

 addition alalusT 



He then continues, * " Lastly, I believe that this 

 most interesting creature probably lived for a consider- 

 ably long time," etc., as just before quoted by us. 



As to this passage, we have, of course, to protest 

 against the idea of the imaginary ape uttering any 

 " danger-signals," still more against its using " imitative 

 sounds in the arbitrary way that Mr. Darwin suggests," 

 and instead of allowing that " it must have advanced," 

 sooner or later, so as " to have become comparable with 

 an infant about two years of age," we affirm it could 

 never have done so, or attained to any " tolerably free 

 exchange [!] of receptual ideas " — which are not " ideas " 

 at all. What, also, can be more misleading or unreason- 

 able than to say, "Next, I think it probable that the 

 advance of receptual intelligence which would have 

 been occasioned by the advance in sign-making, would 

 in turn have led to a further development of the latter — 

 the two thus acting and reacting on one another " ? But 



* P- 379- 



