292 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



of this faculty there can have been no earlier stage than 

 that of articulation." But, as we have pointed out again 

 and again, the question does not concern conceptual 

 speech, but mental conception ; and it has been also 

 expressly pointed out that mental conception by no 

 means depends on the power of articulation, but may 

 exist for a long time, or always, without it. 



Mr. Romanes accuses his opponents of begging the 

 question if they assume " that prior to the appearance 

 of the earliest phase of articulation, it is impossible that 

 any hitherto speechless animal should have been erect 

 in attitude, intelligent enough to chip flints, or greatly 

 in advance of other animals in the matter of making 

 indicative [non-conceptual] gestures, and probably vocal 

 tones." But we assume nothing of the kind. It is 

 possible, as we said in our first chapter, that so-called 

 palaeolithic man may not have been human at all. We 

 have also no evidence as to the degree of development 

 to which mere instinct can attain without being able to 

 make one gesture indicative of the possession of a real 

 idea of any kind. Mr. Romanes cites * an account of 

 monkeys opening oysters with selected stones, which we 

 can well credit. Nor would the shaping of a stone by 

 an anthropoid ape greatly surprise us, any more than 

 the skilful treatment of trees by the beavers which fell 

 them. 



As to Mr. Romanes's further observations concern- 

 ing the possible or probable growth and development 

 of articulation, as it is altogether beside our conten- 

 tion, nothing need now be added to what has already 

 * Note, p. 382. 



