CONCLUDING REMARKS. 297 



in the preceding pages. Such are (1) his representation 

 that a child which can talk, but which does not speak 

 of itself as " I," cannot be self-conscious ; (2) his state- 

 ment that concepts are but sense-perceptions named ; 

 (3) his representation of " percepts " as not being truly- 

 intellectual states at all ; (4) his failure to distinguish 

 between direct and reflex self-consciousness ; (5) his 

 serious relation of incredible tales about animals ; (6) 

 his confused representation of sign-making, wherein, 

 from neglect to define what is and should be meant 

 by " a sign," he is led to read into the so-called " sign- 

 making " actions of animals, meanings which need not 

 necessarily be attributed to them, and which other facts 

 show us ought not to be attributed to them ; and, lastly, 

 (7) his curious statements about his opponents, which 

 result from his inexplicable failure to comprehend their 

 standpoint. This failure is so utter that, as we have 

 seen, he actually takes for granted that his opponents 

 are " Nominalists " — a mistake which, when we first 

 met with it, seemed to us so impossible, that we 

 thought we must ourselves have misunderstood the 

 author we had undertaken to criticize. 



Having most carefully considered every argument 

 put forward by Mr. Romanes, and tried our best to 

 weigh accurately every fact brought forward by him, 

 we must confess ourselves more than ever confident of 

 the truth of the judgment we have now so long main- 

 tained—the judgment that between the intellect of man 

 and the highest psychical power of any and every brute 

 there is an essential difference of kind, also involving, 

 of course, a difference of origin. 



