146 GIORDANO BRUNO PART 



is eternal, therefore, in order that the infinite power 

 may in it be realised. In all these respects Bruno trans- 

 forms the orthodox Cusanus' conception of a created 

 and finite world ; although nowhere perhaps has the 

 idea of a creation been more skilfully woven into a 

 profound philosophical system than in the Cardinal's 

 quaint dialogues. The Cusan does not attempt the 

 impossible, to account for the fact of creation " God 

 comprehends (or contains) all things, for all things are 

 in Him, and He unfolds all things out of Himself, for 

 in all things He lives" ; but the essence and the process 

 of the comprehension and the unfolding are unknow- 

 able by us, just as we can never understand how chance 

 comes to be united with necessity (creation) in the world. 

 It is to this incomprehensible partnership that the im- 

 perfections of created things are attributed. In its 

 reality the universe is finite, limited ; in its possibility 

 (i.e. its idea) it is infinite, but only privatively infinite 

 that is, God could still call a more perfect universe 

 into existence than it has actually pleased Him to do. 

 Only He, as the Absolute Greatest, is infinite in the 

 full negative sense, i.e. that which can neither be nor be 

 thought greater than it is. Here Bruno's theory is in 

 complete contrast with that of the Cusan. There are, 

 however, many consequences that both alike have 

 drawn, as that no two things in the universe are wholly 

 and in all respects alike (the identity of indiscernible s} ; 

 each thing expresses the nature of the whole in a special 

 way, but all things may be arranged in graduated 

 scales from the lowest to the highest, or from any one 

 to any other, i.e. there are no absolute differences, only 

 differences of degree. Nor are there absolute centres in 

 the universe, or in any of the worlds, nor perfect figures 

 thus there are no perfect circles described, e.g. by the 



