ii SUBSTANCE: IMMORTALITY 159 



of the lower that are present in the higher being, and 

 that to a higher degree. As internal it constitutes the 

 soul in all things down to the very lowest, although 

 in these it is repressed or latent. This all-presence 

 of soul does not mean, however, that each particular 

 thing, e.g. a table or garment, is, as such, a living and 

 sensible being, but only that in everything, however 

 small or insignificant, there is a portion or share of 

 spirit, animating it, and this, a if it find a pro- 

 perly disposed subject, may extend itself so as to 

 become plant or animal, and may receive the limbs 

 of any body whatsoever, such as is commonly 

 said to be animate." Even the smallest material 

 body, therefore, has in it the potentiality of life and 

 mind. 



It follows that there are, strictly speaking, only Substance, 

 two substances^ matter and spirit : all particular things 

 result from the composition in varying degrees of 

 these two are therefore mere C{ accidents," and have 

 no abiding reality. Bruno joins issue in this with the 

 Peripatetics, to whom the " real man," for example, 

 is a composite of body and soul, or the true soul is 

 the perfection or actualisation of the living body, or 

 is a resultant from a certain harmony of form and 

 of limbs. 1 Death or dissolution would mean to them 

 the loss of their being ; whereas neither " body nor 

 soul need fear death, for both matter and form are 

 constant abiding principles." 2 This theory of sub- 

 stance and of immortality was regarded by Bruno 

 as one of the cardinal points of his philosophy, 3 and 

 one in which he differed most widely from Aristotle, 

 as interpreted by him, and from the Aristotelians. Its 

 statement, and the criticism of the Peripatetics, occur 



1 Cf. Arist. De Anima, ii. ch. I and 2. 2 Lag. 238. 34. 8 Cf. Lucretius. 



