ii SPIRIT AND MATTER 161 



Causa however, Bruno maintains quite clearly the 

 substantiality of the universal soul alone, the finite 

 individual being merely one of the modes of its de- 

 termination in matter. 1 



Having shown that no part of matter is ever entirely 

 without " form," Bruno leaves aside for the present the 

 question whether all form (Spirit) is equally accompanied 

 by matter. The form or world-soul is not more than 

 one, for all numerical multiplication depends on matter. 

 It is in itself unchanging ; only the objects vary, the 

 different portions of matter into which it enters : and 

 although in the object it is the spirit or form which 

 causes the part to differ from the whole, yet // does 

 not differ in the part or in the whole. There are 

 differences of aspect only, according as it is regarded as 

 (a) subsisting in itself, or as () the actuality and per- 

 fection of some object, or as (^) referred to different 

 objects with different dispositions. 2 That is, Spirit in 

 itself, the universal Spirit, the Spirit or Soul of a 

 particular animate being, the Spirits or Souls of a number 

 of different beings (a system of beings), these are all the 

 same thing looked at from different points of view. It 

 is the same unique Spirit which determines the life of the 

 human individual, the development of the human race 

 as a whole, and the persistence of the world ; the soul of 

 Caesar and the spirit of humanity are one with the soul 

 of the universe. The relation of spirit to matter in 

 Bruno's philosophy is more difficult to understand. 

 Spirit is said to be neither external to nor mixed 

 with matter, nor inherent in it, but " inexistent," i.e. 

 associated with or present to it. Moreover it is defined 

 and determined by matter, because having in itself 

 power to realise particular things of innumerable kinds, 



1 Vide Infra, ch. 5. 2 Lag. 240. 28. 



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