ii IDENTITY IN GOD 167 



in its kinds and principal members, as containing all 

 matter, to which no element of the whole (the universal) 

 form can be added, in which no phase of that form is 

 ever wanting ; but it is not all that which it may be in 

 its differences, its modes, properties, and individuals ; 

 thus it is a mere shadow of the first reality, and first 

 potency, and so far in it reality and possibility are not 

 the same absolutely, that no part of it is all that which 

 it may be : besides that, as we have said, the universe is 

 all that it may be only in explicitness, dispersion, dis- 

 tinctness, whereas its principle is so unitedly and in- 

 differently, for in it all is all, and the same, simply, 

 without difference or distinction." * 



Bruno works out at considerable length the paradoxes 

 to which this identity of all possibility and all reality 

 in the first principle lead. Thus, in magnitude it is both 

 greatest and least, and as in magnitude, so in goodness, 

 in beauty ; the sun would fitly represent such a 

 principle if it were at the same moment in all parts of 

 the universe, if its motion were so swift that it was 

 everywhere at once, and therefore motionless. God, 

 however, is not only all that the sun may be, but also 

 all that everything else may be " potency of all 

 potencies, reality of all realities, life of all lives, soul of 

 all souls, being of all beings." That which elsewhere is 

 contrary and opposite, is in Him one and the same. 2 

 Bruno has brought us back in a curious way to the 

 very first principle which he proposed to exclude from 

 contemplation : it can be understood, it is true, only by 

 negations, for our intellect cannot measure itself with 

 the immeasurable : we can form no image or idea of a 

 great that might not be greater. But here follows one 

 of the most vital steps in his philosophy : As the 



1 Lag. 257, 258. 2 Lag. 258-260. 



