174 GIORDANO BRUNO PART 



differ from body, where potency and act are one and the 

 same thing. If point does not differ from body, centre 

 from circumference, finite from infinite, the greatest from 

 the least, then the universe, as we have said, is all centre, 

 or the centre of the universe is everywhere ; or, again, 

 the circumference is everywhere but the centre is 

 nowhere." Thus, not only are the particular existences 

 indifferent in the infinite : they have also in it no true 

 reality, i.e. their existence is a purely relative one. 



We have now to consider the relation of particular 

 things one to another. It follows from the argument 

 that all things are in all ; each particular thing has the 

 possibility of all reality, has all reality implicit in itself, 

 but only one mode is at any particular time realised, and 

 the life of particular things consists in their constant 

 transmutation from one mode to another. While the 

 universe comprehends all existence and all modes of 

 existence, of particular things, each has all existence, 

 but not all modes of existence, and cannot actually have 

 all circumstances and accidents, for many forms are 

 incompatible in the same subject, either as contraries or 

 as belonging to diverse species. The same individual 

 subject (supposito) cannot be under the accidents of 

 horse and of man, under the dimensions of a plant and 

 of an animal. Moreover, the universe comprehends 

 all existence wholly, because outside of and beyond 

 infinite existence there is nothing that exists, for there 

 is no outside or beyond : of particular things on the 

 other hand, each comprehends all existence, but not 

 wholly, for beyond each are infinite others. But the 

 ens, substance, essence of all is one, which being 

 infinite and unlimited in its substance as in its duration, 

 in its greatness as in its force, can neither be called 

 principle nor resultant ; for as everything concurs in its 



