ii THE WORLDS INNUMERABLE 191 



kind. Perfection has no reference to quantity, nor to 

 limitation by self, which is a geometrical determination. 1 

 For this mechanical idea of perfection, Bruno substitutes 

 a teleological ; the perfect is that which consists of a 

 number of parts or members, working together towards 

 the end for which the whole is ordained : the universe 

 is perfect " as adorned by so many worlds, which are 

 so many deities, and as that inland to which, as a unity 

 embracing the perfection of all, innumerable things 

 perfect in their kind are reduced, referred, united." 2 



The infinity of space or ether and of matter being infinite 

 proved, it follows again, by the principle of sufficient 

 reason, that the <c worlds " are " innumerable " or infinite 

 in number. As it is good that the world exists, and 

 would be bad did it not exist, so in a similar space, and 

 where similar causes are, it is good that there be a world, 

 and bad should there not be one. If the world is single, 

 then there is a single, finite, particular good, and infinite 

 wide-spread universal evil. He who is able to produce 

 good, and does not do so, without cause, is evil ; " as 

 not to be able is privatively evil, to be able and to be 

 unwilling would be so positively, and God in regard to 

 the finite effect would be a finitely good cause, in regard, 

 however, to the repression of infinite realisation, would 

 be infinitely evil/' 3 Perfection does not belong 

 to our world, our system, taken by itself, since 

 there are innumerable other possible worlds which 

 cannot be contained in it. Given a man endowed 

 with all human perfections, the existence of other 



1 Bk. ii. ch. 13. 2 Cf. also infra, p. 199 ff. 



3 Delmm, bk. i. ch. 10. pp. 235-8 ; cf. Infinite, 312 f., 316. Bruno does not use the 

 term " principle of sufficient reason " : his principle is the inverse of that of Leibniz 

 ** whatever has not a sufficient reason for existing is necessarily non-existent," Bruno's 

 being that "whatever has not a sufficient reason for non-existence (i.e. whatever is 

 possible) necessarily exists." 



