ii IDENTITY IN KIND OF ALL BEINGS 215 



wise. 1 Bruno has grasped, however confusedly, the 

 idea that each individual, each being in the uni- 

 verse, is as it were an epitome of the universe itself ; 

 that each therefore stands in a peculiar relation to it, 

 differing from it only in the " proportion " in which the 

 elements are composed into unity. It is impossible not to 

 see in this idea the germ of the most important develop- 

 ment of Leibniz* philosophy, whatever the source may 

 have been through which it came to the latter. It is 

 true that here, at least, Bruno's conception appears 

 much less spiritual than that of his successor, inasmuch 

 as he is thinking rather of the actual physical elements 

 which go to make up a body (and in which all bodies 

 are similar to one another). On the other hand, the 

 formation of the body is, in his view, the work of 

 the soul, and it is in the last resort the identity of the 

 universal soul of nature in all its members that brings 

 each of these into correspondence with all others. It 

 is true, also, that Bruno has no definite explanation 

 of what constitutes an individual, and his readers are 

 exposed to the dilemma either of regarding the 

 physical atoms as themselves u beseelt" a view which 

 Bruno nowhere sanctions, or, on the other hand, of 

 accepting a dualism of spirit (the soul of the universe 

 or God) and matter (the material atoms, moisture, fire, 

 and ether). Yet the tenour of Bruno's philosophy is 

 wholly opposed to such a dualism. As a corollary of 

 this theory, Bruno suggested an explanation of what has 

 been called " spontaneous generation," supported, how- 

 ever, by tales of the credulous rather than by actual 

 observation. " Dust that has been heated by the sun, 

 as soon as moisture falls upon it, becomes a frog, the 

 whole substance of dung goes into worms or flies, the 



1 De Lam. bk. v. ch. 2 (p. 119). 



