ii THE THREE MINIMA " 227 



was never fully carried out, 1 the times being not yet 

 ripe for the complete separation of the speculative and 

 the experimental or observational sciences. In referring 

 the atomic theory to metaphysics, Bruno showed a true Atomism 



r .... . . - a meta- 



mstmct, for while in one sense atomism is a scientific physical 

 hypothesis capable of furnishing laws which explain the doctnne - 

 interaction of bodies, the corpuscular theory, and as 

 such has proved its value by the brilliant developments 

 of recent years, on the other hand, it is also a presup- 

 position of knowledge, a ground of the possibility of 

 our knowledge of body, and therefore has its place in 

 speculative theory, or metaphysics, in the widest sense. 

 Both points of view are presented in Bruno's doctrine, 

 but that from which he starts is the epistemological, 

 following in this the guidance of Nicholas of Cusa. 



Knowledge is measurement, and all measure implies Knowledge 



. . . 11-1 c i TTT M i implies the 



a minimum in each kind or being. Were it possible to atom, 

 subdivide anything ad infinitum, the half would be 

 potentially equal to the whole, and measurement frus- 

 trated. There must be a limit to division, an ultimate 

 part, which itself has no parts, and which is the sub- 

 stance of the composition into which it enters, the com- 

 position on the other hand being an "accident" of this 

 minimum. As it is primarily a condition of measure- 

 ment, the minimum differs in the different spheres of Relativity 

 measure or knowledge to which the category of 

 quantity applies. In magnitudes of one or two dimen- 

 sions it is the point, in bodies the atom, in numbers the 

 monad or unity. Thus number is accident of the 

 monad, monad is the essence of number, as composition 

 is accident of the atom, atom is essence of the com- 

 posite. Again, the " sensible minimum " must be far 

 greater than the natural or real minimum, for in so far 



1 Vide De Mia. p. 211 (bk. ii. ch. 6). 



